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theories in normative ethics, but is rather to read as ‘the domain of the deontic’.
 Review Article 
 Th inking about Normativity: Ralph Wedgwood 
on ‘Ought’ 
 Wim  de Muijnck 
 Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen,  Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen 
 Postbus 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen,  Th e Netherlands 
 w.demuijnck@planet.nl  
 Abstract 
 Ralph Wedgwood’s  Th e Nature of Normativity provides a theory about the semantics, metaphysics, 
and epistemology of normative judgments, taken to be judgments of the form ‘I ought to φ’. Th e 
theory is based on the principle of Normative Judgment Internalism, and the principle that ‘the 
intentional is normative’. I argue, ﬁ rst, that by being merely about oughts, Wedgwood’s account 
leaves out one essential constituent of normativity: value. Secondly, I argue that mainly because 
of this, the account faces a serious issue of relevance. 
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 Introduction 
 Normativity is a broad subject: it covers the wide ﬁ eld of issues connected 
with  reasons . We might divide this ﬁ eld into three domains. As it is discussed 
in the philosophical literature, normativity includes the domain of ‘ought’ and 
‘should’: of duties and obligations, prohibitions, and permissions. In brief, 
normativity includes  deontology . 1 It also includes  rationality , the consistency 
among our beliefs, desires, feelings, goals, actions, and identity. And as these 
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latter things do not occur out of the blue, normativity also includes the domain 
of  value , of what is good or bad, important or unimportant, to be sought or 
avoided—the domain of needs, goals, preferences, and interests. 
 Th ese three domains—deontology, rationality, and value—are closely inter-
connected. Th ey are all aspects of the classic ‘is-ought’ distinction’s right side. 
None can be conceived in abstraction of the others. But because nonetheless 
deontology, rationality, and value are not entirely the same thing, it is possible 
to approach normativity in diﬀ erent ways. Th is, among other things, is why 
normativity is a diﬃ  cult subject. Th ere are three big issues about normativity 
in general. First, what do normative concepts or expressions refer to? Secondly, 
are there normative facts of the matter? And thirdly, how could we know 
about such facts? 
 Many philosophical subdisciplines have to come to terms with normativity, 
some way or other: metaphysics, the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of 
mind and action, normative ethics, meta-ethics, aesthetics, and all the diﬀ er-
ent branches of philosophy on social, political and cultural issues. Normativity 
is not a side issue: much of the terminology needed to even mention a subject 
in any of these ﬁ elds is normative in character. Our reality, we might say, is 
deeply normative. 
 Because of this, we can assume that mistaken assumptions about normativ-
ity in any of its aspects will hamper progress in any of the ﬁ elds just men-
tioned. A book called  Th e Nature of Normativity , clarifying the semantics of 
normative discourse, the metaphysics of normative facts, and the epistemol-
ogy of normative belief, could thus be of great beneﬁ t to many philosophical 
debates at once. 
 Ralph Wedgwood has written such a book. At its core is an impressive 
account of the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of ‘ought’. It is an 
inventive, yet carefully constructed philosophical ediﬁ ce, the ripened fruit of 
exchanges with an impressive list of great minds (as a look at the Preface makes 
clear). It addresses issues across diverse philosophical subdisciplines. It pres-
ents meticulous and intricate arguments that are sensitive to subtleties and 
counterarguments at every turn. Th e writing is compact and highly abstract, 
but is also elegant and readable. 
 Although naturalistic thinking about normativity (Aristotelian, Humean, 
Darwinian, or otherwise) seems on the rise, Wedgwood’s approach is overtly 
rationalistic. Wedgwood assumes that minded beings such as us are   essentially 
rational. He also assumes that the reasons in our minds govern our actions. 
Given these connections among mindedness, rationality, and agency, which 
are conceptual as well as constitutive, ‘ought’ is interpreted by Wedgwood 
as that which is rational. Th e approach is realistic about oughts: if there is 
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an abstract domain of  a priori rational truths, and if oughts belong to that 
domain, then they must be real. 
 I have indicated above of what great use a general theory of normativity 
could be . Does Wedgwood give us what we need? I have a worry. It is kindled 
by the book’s focus, which is on deontology and rationality, but not on value. 
My worry is that because of this, the results the book achieves face a serious 
issue of relevance. Th e results, I wish to argue, will be relevant to debates in 
semantics, logic, epistemology and metaphysics, but they will leave empty-
handed the philosophers in the ﬁ elds mentioned earlier, including ethics and 
social and political philosophy—the ﬁ elds where normativity is most perti-
nent and where a theory of normativity could be the most helpful. I will try to 
explain my worry, below. 
 Th e Main Argument 
 Wedgwood’s aim in  Th e Nature of Normativity is a ‘substantive philosophical 
explanation’ (p. 4) of normative thought, truth, and knowledge. Th e book has 
three parts. Part I is about the semantics of normative concepts and terms, 
Part II is about the metaphysics of normative facts, and Part III is about the 
epistemology of normative beliefs. 
 Th e account is a defence of normative realism: against non-cognitivist views 
such as expressivism, Wedgwood will argue that normative judgments can be 
literally true or false, hence that there are normative facts of the matter that 
can be known and be referred to. It is also nonreductionistic: Wedgwood’s 
account will itself rely on normative terminology. 
 Th ere is a special reason for this. One of Wedgwood’s key principles is that 
‘the intentional is normative’ (p. 2): normativity and intentionality are so 
closely connected—conceptually, ontologically, and epistemically—that any 
philosophical explanation of the former is only possible in terms of the latter, 
and  vice versa . Facts concerning ‘ought’—and these are what Wedgwood’s 
account is all about— may be noncircularly and nontrivially explained in terms 
of something else—but this something will be intentionality. And, as Wedgwood 
argues, intentionality in this sense cannot be a matter of straightforward ‘purely 
psychological predicates’ (p. 172). Th e explanation thus cannot be reductive: 
the required intentional terms in the metalanguage, such as ‘reasoning’, ‘infer-
ence’ and ‘deliberation’, are themselves essentially normative in character. 
 Th e other key principle in Wedgwood’s argument, closely related to ‘the 
intentional is normative’ principle, is Normative Judgment Internalism (NJI). 
Th is is the idea that ﬁ rst-person normative judgments are motivating in and 
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of themselves. NJI says that in a normal case and insofar as the agent is 
 rational, if the agent judges: ‘I ought to φ’, then she is necessarily disposed to 
φ. Or at least, she is disposed to intend to φ. Or even more precisely, she is 
disposed to have ‘fully correct plans’ for what to do at a time  t that logically 
imply  p . NJI is limited to situations ‘with no relevant uncertainty’ (p. 31) and 
where what the agent does or does not do is ‘manifestly dependent on inten-
tion’ (p. 30). 
 Wedgwood initially presents this principle as a ‘compelling’ intuition 
(p. 11) that every account of normativity should be able to explain. Th is is 
why in Chapter 3 a ‘conceptual analysis’ approach for normative statements 
is rejected: even if intuitively plausible  non-normative necessary and suﬃ  cient 
conditions could be speciﬁ ed for the truth of such statements, these would 
not explain NJI. Later on (chapter 4), Wedgwood uses this very principle to 
deﬁ ne the essence of ‘ought’. ‘Ought’ will then turn out to be the concept 
that bridges the gap between mere mental states and actions, at least those of 
a rational agent in normal circumstances. Th us, ‘ought’ will be just the con-
cept that plays the regulative role in practical reasoning that is demanded 
by NJI . 
 Given the central position of NJI in Wedgwood’s argument, it is no coin-
cidence that the entire book is about the concept of ‘ought’. In Wedgwood’s 
account, normativity consists mainly in what ought to be done or ought to be 
the case. Th e argument in the book is thus centred around oughts and NJI, 
and rationality ﬁ gures as an essential precondition. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 are about semantical issues. Wedgwood argues here that 
a semantics for normative statements will have to be truth-conditional. But a 
truth-conditional semantics for such statements will have to be nonreduction-
istic, i.e., be couched in normative terms, otherwise it will not be able to 
explain the essential regulative role in practical reasoning that NJI entails for 
ought-judgments. 
 Is there a truth-conditional semantics of normative statements that  can 
explain NJI? Yes, Wedgwood claims, and this will have to be a ‘conceptual role 
semantics’. Such a semantics speciﬁ es the ‘basic rules of rationality’ (p. 82) for 
using a concept—in this case the concept of the so-called ‘practical ought’. For 
it is precisely these rules that make the ‘practical ought’ the concept it is. And 
as these rules specify that in the deliberation of a rational agent a judgment 
‘I ought to φ’ disposes the agent to intend to φ, a conceptual role semantics 
for ‘ought’ entails NJI. 
 In more detail: Wedgwood’s conceptual role semantics for ‘ought’ tells us 
that ‘for any proposition  p , “ O <A, t> ( p )” is true just in case there are fully correct 
plans for  A to have about what to do at  t that logically entail  p , and no such 
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fully correct plan that logically entails the negation of  p ’ (p. 102). ‘Ought’ is 
here taken to be a propositional operator that indexes a proposition  p to an 
agent  A and a time  t. 
 In chapter 6, the argument changes from semantics to metaphysics. 
Wedgwood aims to give a ‘constitutive’ (p. 136) account of normative proper-
ties, but not a reduction. Such an account must take the form of bicondition-
als that state necessary and suﬃ  cient conditions for the exempliﬁ cation of 
normative properties, and these conditions should state the essences of the 
properties. But it will not be possible, Wedgwood claims, to state these condi-
tions non-circularly, i.e., entirely in non-normative terms. 
 Th e reason for this is given in chapters 7 and 8. In chapter 7, Wedgwood 
argues for the principle that ‘the intentional is normative’ (p. 158): the essence 
of intentional states can only be speciﬁ ed in normative terms, while oughts 
can only be speciﬁ ed in terms of intentional states. Th us, ‘the normative and 
the intentional must each be mentioned in giving an account of the other’ 
(p. 163). Chapter 8 oﬀ ers additional, but related, arguments against reductive 
naturalism, which in this case consists in forms of functionalism. 
 Wedgwood’s metaphysical argument takes a route that is diﬀ erent from 
that of the argument about semantics, but note that there is a close connec-
tion. In the case of semantics explaining NJI, i.e., conceptually linking up 
‘ought’ with motivation, was the central issue; in the case of metaphysics, it is 
the normative essence of the intentional. But as the intentional involves prac-
tical reasoning and motivation, we are again looking at the linkage between 
‘ought’ and motivation: formerly a conceptual, now a constitutive linkage. 
 It was already argued that an ought, indexing a proposition  p to an agent  A 
and a time  t , consists in there being fully correct plans for  A about what to do 
at  t that imply  p . Th e question must now be answered what it means for any 
‘plans’ (which are here understood as intentional states) to be ‘correct’. 
Wedgwood’s answer is that it is essential to these states that they are causally 
regulated by standards of rationality. Just as the standards of rational  belief 
must be oriented towards the goal of having correct beliefs, the standards of 
rational  choice must be oriented towards the goal of choosing correctly. 
 Th e next question is what it is for someone to be capable of intentional 
states. Wedgwood’s answer is that it is someone’s disposition to ‘conform to 
the principles of rationality’ (p. 164). But could such dispositions not be spec-
iﬁ ed without mentioning normative properties? Wedgwood argues that any 
rational disposition (from stimulus conditions to a reaction) can be ‘defeated’ 
(p. 170), which means that a disposition is rational only when ‘defeating con-
ditions’ are absent. What unites defeating conditions  in being defeaters is pre-
cisely the rationality that is defeated, which is a normative relation. 
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 Wedgwood’s book is much richer than the above can convey. Th ere are 
excursions into subjects such as deontic logic (chapter 5), mental causation 
(chapter 7), and modal logic and supervenience (chapter 9). Ideas developed 
in the book include an account of ‘essence’ and a corresponding account of 
nonreductive naturalism in chapters 6 and 8; a dispositionalist account of 
mental states in chapter 7 and section 8.4, where the notion of a ‘rational 
disposition’ is developed; a version of non- S 5 modal logic and a corresponding 
way of understanding supervenience in chapter 9; and ﬁ nally, an intuitionist 
account of  a priori normative knowledge in Part III. Th e book would not be 
easy to summarize in its entirety. But I hope that what I have said above gives 
a fair impression of Wedgwood’s main line of argument. 
 Oughts and Values 
 Earlier on, I distinguished three aspects usually associated with normativity: 
deontology, rationality, and value. From the above, we can learn that 
Wedgwood’s account captures deontology and rationality, but not value. Th e 
introduction of Normative Judgment Internalism (NJI) on pages 23-34 is a 
crucial moment: normative judgments are here declared to be ought- judgments, 
i.e., judgments about what one ought to do, all things considered. Normativity 
thus becomes ‘oughtness’, rather than ‘to-be-consideredness’. Th e reasons that 
enter into our practical thinking to generate ought-judgments are left out of 
the picture. Because this is the basis of my claim that Wedgwood’s account 
faces an issue of relevance, let me explain it in some detail. 
 Consider that people act for reasons that can be diverse. We could say that 
these reasons concern diﬀ erent types of values that generate corresponding 
types of reasons. Th ey can be moral or prudential, but also hedonic, conven-
tional, legal, aesthetic, religious, and so on. In practical reasoning people con-
sider reasons, and reach, if they can, a verdict on what they ought to do. Th ere 
is much of a normative character already present before an agent has reached 
any conclusion about what she, all things considered, ought to do: needs and 
interests, values and value judgments,  a priori duties, rules and conventions, 
and so on. Th ese things will also be present when no such conclusion can 
be reached—in situations of what Wedgwood calls ‘relevant uncertainty’ 
(p. 31). 
 Together, they are the input of a process of practical reasoning, while an 
ought-judgment is the output. Ought I to buy this painting? Well, it is beauti-
ful. But it is also stolen. Aesthetic, moral, prudential and legal considerations 
come to bear, and they all give me reasons for or against buying. Perhaps 
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I ought to buy the painting, perhaps I ought not to do it, or perhaps no such 
conclusion is warranted. But  if there is an ought, it will depend on reasons—
while these reasons do not, in turn, depend on this ought. Th ere may not even 
be any ought. Note that even if I cannot, out of uncertainty, decide what I 
ought to do, I might still decide to act, and act for a reason. For instance, I 
might decide to buy the painting because it is beautiful, even if I am not sure 
that buying it is what, all things considered, I ought to do. So acting for a 
reason is not the same thing as acting on the basis of an ought-judgment. 
 Th us, in order to reach an ought-judgment, reasons of diﬀ erent types have 
to be weighed, typically involving numerous normatively signiﬁ cant facts. On 
Wedgwood’s own view, oughts are a type of entity with the character of all-
things-considered-for-an-agent-at-a-time. Mere ‘evaluative’ properties like 
‘nice’, ‘ugly’, ‘legal’, ‘just’, ‘appropriate’, ‘sacred’, etc. are the input, and oughts 
the output, of practical reasoning. We might say that the former are the raw 
materials from which oughts are constructed. What Wedgwood’s account 
ignores are these raw materials. 
 Admitting that it is reasons that generate oughts, one might claim that 
normativity-proper is a domain of rational oughts, but not of values. But note 
how implausible this would be. First, all normative concepts are evaluative. 
Saying that one ought not to steal, or that moving a rook diagonally is not 
permitted is, among other things, attributing a negative value to stealing, or to 
going diagonally with a rook. Th e converse also seems to hold: from positive 
or negative value follow  prima facie reasons for behaviour. 
 Secondly, values are arguably the more basic category within the normative 
domain. For values generate reasons, which generate oughts. And while values 
are the basis for ought-judgments, the converse does not seem to hold. Th ink, 
for instance, of a useless rule-governed procedure: it will ring hollow to say 
that the rules ought to be followed because they are rules, hence prescriptive. 
Even if we do see a type of ‘oughtness’ here, this will only generate value for 
those who value the following of rules just because they are rules. 
 Nowhere in his book does Wedgwood suggest that the domain of value 
 should be ignored. Chapter 6, for instance, is not primarily on oughts but on, 
indeed, value, rightness, and moral wrongness. Wedgwood does acknowledge 
such properties, be it only in passing. On page 68, he does distinguish evalu-
ative terms, like ‘good’, ‘desirable’ and ‘valuable’, from “normative terms like 
‘ought’”, but he stresses that the two are closely related. 
 Be this as it may, Wedgwood does restrict his main argument to oughts—to 
the couple of deontology and rationality. Th e point is not that the questions 
about ‘ought’ that he chooses to deal with cannot be properly addressed with-
out addressing value. It seems clear that they can. But these questions, in 
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bypassing the domain of value, lead to a theory of normativity that has hardly 
any connections to the real natural world. Wedgwood is mainly occupied with 
essences and necessities. His way of theorizing is to forge tight conceptual and 
constitutive linkages between mind, theoretical and practical rationality, moti-
vation, and ‘ought’. Th ere is no room here for value. True, values are linked, 
conceptually and constitutively, with oughts by being reasons. But values will 
only become reasons for an agent in virtue of his being situated in a natural 
world. 
 Th is is why studying value requires engaging with the discourses of com-
mon sense and empirical research. And this is clearly not Wedgwood’s priority. 
When he does address the way his abstract normativity relates to the natural 
world, what he oﬀ ers is a purely abstract theory of supervenience. Although 
he claims that normativity and intentionality are ‘metaphysically irreducible’ 
(p. 6), he also argues at some length (chapters 8 and 9) that his account is com-
 patible with a moderate form of ‘metaphysical naturalism’ (p. 3). Normative 
facts are said to be ‘realized in’ (p. 6) natural facts and causally eﬃ  cacious. But 
none of this tells us much about the interplay of reasons motivating ordinary 
agents. 
 Relevance 
 I have argued that Wedgwood’s theory of normativity, by focusing on rational 
oughts, abstracts from the domain of value. But why should this be a problem? 
If we deplore Wedgwood’s exclusive focus on ‘ought’, he still explores it thor-
oughly and in many inventive ways.  Th e Nature of Normativity is impressive as 
an ‘intersubdisciplinary’ (p. vii)  tour de force . Wedgwood points out that ‘the 
goals of this book require drawing on ideas from many diﬀ erent branches of 
philosophy’ (p. vii): metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, phi-
losophy of mind, ethics, and logic. Th e result of all this contributes to diﬀ er-
ent philosophical ﬁ elds in its turn. 
 Th en, why worry about relevance? Let me mention two general consider-
ations, and substantiate them by discussing four relevance-related themes. My 
ﬁ rst consideration is that Wedgwood’s main results may be relevant to debates 
in the philosophical subdisciplines just mentioned, but that they have little to 
oﬀ er to precisely those ﬁ elds and debates in philosophy where normativity is 
an issue. Put diﬀ erently: Wedgwood contributes to the very philosphical sub-
disciplines that he draws upon, but he does not have much to oﬀ er outside 
of these subdisciplines. In the Introduction, I mentioned as relevant ﬁ elds: 
‘metaphysics, the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of mind and action, 
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normative ethics, meta-ethics, aesthetics, and all the diﬀ erent branches of phi-
losophy on social, political and cultural issues’. Of these, only metaphysics 
and philosophy of mind may proﬁ t from  Th e Nature of Normativity . In the 
Conclusion, Wedgwood explores the implications of his results for the ‘phi-
losophy of mind and language’ (p. 267), the ‘theory of rational belief and 
rational choice’ (p. 271), ‘ﬁ rst-order ethical theory’ (p. 273), and ‘the philoso-
phy of religion’ (p. 277). Note that considering the importance of normativity 
as a subject this is a rather limited list, and in the ﬁ rst two cases Wedgwood 
does little more than recapitulate his conclusions. We will also see below that 
he has in fact very little to oﬀ er to ethics. 2 
 My second consideration is that Wedgwood’s rationalistic approach gener-
ates a conception of agency that has little to do with real-world agents. 
Illustrative of Wedgwood’s approach is one of the two paragraphs in the entire 
book that refers to actual empirical psychology (p. 270), 3 where he points out 
that there need not be a conﬂ ict between his own approach and empirical 
research about the contingent features of mental states and capacities. Th ere is 
no hint that his philosophical approach could  inform , or itself be informed by, 
any empirical research. 
 Let me now discuss four themes about which Wedgwood’s account has a 
visible problem with relevance. 
 Reductionism 
 In our thinking about normativity, we may be concerned about various forms 
of reductionism. For instance, are interpersonal relations reducible to the 
results of cost-beneﬁ t analyses, as social exchange theories say? Or is human 
morality merely a sophisticated form of experiences and patterns of coopera-
tion that we already ﬁ nd among primates? 
 Reductionism is a big issue in  Th e Nature of Normativity , but the nonreduc-
tionism that Wedgwood defends in chapters 8 and 9 will in no way help settle 
issues like the ones just mentioned. Consider what happens in chapter 9. 
Here, Wedgwood proposes a version of modal logic that allows (a) non- 
necessary necessity and possibility, thereby allowing (b) the facts of strong 
supervenience in the actual world to be explainable not just by necessary, but 
also by contingent facts, thereby allowing (c) a failure of strong supervenience 
 2 To philosophers of religion, he claims to have shown that impersonal normative require-
ments have the ‘unconditional authority’ (p. 277) that was long monopolized by traditional 
theology.
 3 Th e other one is on p. 177.
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to imply global supervenience, in order, ﬁ nally, to allow (d) a nonreductionist 
notion of ‘realized in’. 
 Th is discussion will no doubt be of interest to specialists in metaphysics, 
but hardly to philosophers working on normativity. Would it really matter, 
one is tempted to ask, if normative and intentional properties might be ‘reduc-
ible’ in  some sense, especially because the reducibility would at best amount to 
the coherence of some purely abstract metaphysical ( here: functionalistic) 
framework? It is hard to see what diﬀ erence Wedgwood’s nonreductionism 
could make even to those philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, 
cognitive psychologists and sociobiologists who pursue reductively- naturalistic 
programmes. Th eir reductionism amounts to the exploration of mental capac-
ities at some explanatory level other than the intentional, something that is 
quite diﬀ erent from the metaphysically ambitious and abstract forms of reduc-
tionism that Wedgwood argues against. 
 Ethics 
 Wedgwood claims that his account has implications for ‘ﬁ rst-order ethical 
theory’ (p. 273), in helping it to answer the question ‘Why should I be moral?’ 
Wedgwood does not explicitly state his answer, but the answer that  can 
be given on the basis of his account is that, given our capacity to ask this 
 question—which is in fact an ought-question—, we are necessarily disposed 
to be sensitive to the standards of rationality that are oriented towards the goal 
of choosing correctly. But what makes the question ‘Why should I be moral?’ 
pertinent to an ethicist is that it generally means: ‘Why should my moral rea-
sons have priority over my other reasons?’ To this question, an answer such as 
the one just given is obviously inadequate. 
 Indeed, Wedgwood’s contribution to ethical theory could only be a merry-
go-round of concepts such as ‘correct’, ‘rational’ and ‘ought’. Consider:
 It may be that virtuous character involves a disposition to engage in praiseworthy 
sorts of practical reasoning, and such praiseworthy sorts of practical reasoning 
may themselves involve normative thinking (such as thinking about what one 
ought to do). Clearly any such account of the virtues, or of the praiseworthy 
forms of practical reasoning and decision making, will have to be informed by 
a good account of the nature of normative judgments, such as the account that 
I have developed here (p. 274). 
 What it is that makes practical reasoning ‘praiseworthy’, or choices and 
plans ‘correct’, however, is not part of the theory—it abstracts from value. But 
especially in ethics, it is vital to know how to navigate in this domain, i.e., 
among the many diﬀ erent kinds of reasons real-life situations give us. 
 W. de Muijnck / Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010) 133–144 143
Are there plausible principles available to rank them (such as: ‘Moral reasons 
must have priority over prudential reasons’)? Can such principles be justiﬁ ed? 
Would all rational creatures choose the same ranking? And so on. Th ese issues 
do not become vivid in Wedgwood’s account of normativity because, as we 
have seen, this account starts at the point where all the diﬀ erent ingredients of 
practical reason have already been processed into an ought. 
 Th e Actual Role of Oughts 
 Wedgwood’s account of normativity is all about oughts. Here, we need not ques-
tion the assumption that it is our essence that we are rational beings, nor that we 
are capable of forming ought-judgments and of acting on them. But how much 
of our agency  is actually governed by ought-judgments—at least such as are the 
products of practical reasoning? We have already seen that acting for a reason 
need not coincide with acting on the basis of an ought-judgment. And it seems 
that we engage in practical reasonings that issue in an ought-judgment mainly in 
those rare situations when we face a really diﬃ  cult decision. 
 Th ere is some reason to believe that the space for oughts is even narrower 
than this. First, if social psychologists are correct in thinking that the source of 
much of our behaviour is our social environment, rather than our individual 
personality (hence the deliberations of us as individuals), the number of our 
actions that can be traced back to oughts may shrink considerably. 
 Secondly, psychologists such as Haidt argue that the moral reasons we oﬀ er 
for our actions are (often inadequate) rationalizations after the fact of deci-
sions that have been made unconsciously. 4 Because in Wedgwood’s account 
ought- judgments are the all-things-considered result of practical reasoning, 
rather than the outcome of unconscious processing, they are here sidelined. 
Not that this proves moral deliberation to be irrelevant. Th e point is just that 
real-world agents may turn out to diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly from what a rationalist 
philosophical model assumes about them. And if such a model is merely con-
cerned with abstract deontology and rationality, but not with real agents, irrel-
evancy threatens. 
 Explaining NJI 
 Wedgwood starts oﬀ  by presenting NJI as an important basic principle, and 
then argues that any account of normative judgments is supposed to explain it. 
 4 J. Haidt, ‘Th e Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment’, Psychological Review 108 (2001), pp. 814-34.
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But is NJI really so important when we wish to understand real agents? 
It is hard not to see NJI as a formal principle of rationality, rather than a per-
spicuous matter of fact about real agents. NJI, as Wedgwood presents it, is an 
 a priori principle about the structure of rationality and agency. Th ere exist 
many types of explanation, but NJI, it seems, could only be explained by 
another formal principle that entails it. Th is, indeed, is what Wedgwood’s 
conceptual role semantics of ‘ought’ seems to do. 
 My worry is that such a type of explanation does not tell us much about 
real agents. True, there is something NJI- like about such agents, namely the 
fact that they do sometimes seem to be motivated by their ought-judgments. 
But note that they are motivated by their simpler value judgments just as 
well. 
 Conclusion 
 Above, I have summarized what I consider the main line of argument in Ralph 
Wedgwood’s book  Th e Nature of Normativity . I have also developed an objec-
tion, not to the arguments and conclusions as such, but to the philosophical 
approach to normativity of which these are the result. Th e basis of the objec-
tion is that the book concentrates on the concept of ‘ought’. Th e objection 
itself is that the argument developed in the book faces an issue of relevance. 
 Th e Nature of Normativity lacks intelligible connections with common sense 
and empirical science. 
 Whether or not one likes  Th e Nature of Normativity will depend on what 
one expects a philosophical text to do. It can be argued that the issues dis-
cussed in the book are just intrinsically interesting, and that this should be 
suﬃ  cient to pre-empt complaints about relevance. It can also be argued that 
even if the relevance of a technical philosophical work is not clearly visible at 
present, the work might become highly relevant later on. And it can be argued 
that in philosophy, it is one task to invent theories, and another to apply them. 
I cannot prove considerations like these to be mistaken. But philosophers 
should be wary of them even so: history has just seen too many philosophical 
debates turn scholastic and sterile. My worry is that the kind of analytic phi-
losophy found in  Th e Nature of Normativity also heads in that direction. 
Stating my worry has been my way of asking what doing philosophy is about—
or ought to be .
